Economic stimulus programs that operate through the credit market may give rise to particularly severe moral hazard problems because they change the contracting environment and distort borrower incentives. We test this proposition using a natural experiment arising from a nationwide bailout program for highly-indebted households in India. Our empirical strategy exploits local variation in cross-sectional exposure to the program, as measured by the share of qualifying loans at the time of the program announcement. We find that the program generated no measurable productivity gains, but led to significant moral hazard in loan repayment. Post-program loan performance declines faster in districts with greater exposure to the program, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. In addition, loan defaults become significantly more sensitive to the electoral cycle in the post-program period. This suggests that expectations of future credit market interventions generated by the bailout are an important channel through which moral hazard in loan repayment is intensified.
Introduction
Economic stimulus programs have been used in a wide variety of economic contexts the world over in an effort to spur economic activity. The fundamental question of whether governments can improve economic outcomes through such programs, however, remains controversial and has received heightened attention in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis. While economists in the "Keynesian" tradition advocate government interventions to increase aggregate demand and reduce the negative externalities of a prolonged economic downturn for society (Campbell et al. [2011] , Mian et al. [2010] ), critics argue that fiscal stimulus programs create the potential for political capture and moral hazard and can have adverse distributional consequences (Agarwal et al. [2013] ).
A more nuanced version of this debate considers the comparative merits of different types of economic stimulus programs. In its simplest form, a stimulus program provides direct subsidies or income support to firms and individuals. In many cases, however, stimulus programs operate through the credit market, for example in the form of mandated debt restructuring programs or the public takeover of private liabilities.
The economic argument in favor of stimulus programs operating through the credit market rests on the premise that such policies will prevent excessive deadweight losses from foreclosure in settings where contracts are incomplete and market participants are unable to insure against macroeconomic shocks (Bolton and Rosenthal [2002] ). Opponents of this view argue that political interventions in the credit market are a particularly harmful way of implementing stimulus programs because they change the contracting environment and are likely to give rise to moral hazard problems by distorting borrower expectations. Although this is ultimately an empirical question, very little evidence exists on the effect of such policies on credit supply and ex-post borrower behavior despite the fact that credit-market led stimulus programs are ubiquitous.
We shed light on these issues by analyzing one of the largest household debt relief programs in history, enacted by the government of India in 2008 against the backdrop of the global economic crisis. The program, known as the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme (ADWDRS) consisted of unconditional debt relief for more than 60 million rural households and amounted to a volume of more than US$ 16 billion or 1.7% of GDP.
India's ADWDRS program is an especially attractive testing ground to explore the impact of a stimulus program on credit market outcomes for several reasons. First, the program is quite representative of a wide range of stimulus programs executed through policy interventions in the credit market. In the United States, several states intervened into debt contracts by passing debt moratoria intended to prevent excessive foreclosures and to protect rural constituencies from the fallout of the Great Depression (Rucker and Alston [1987] ). More recent interventions in debt contracts in the United States include programs for mortgage renegotiation in response to the foreclosure crisis of 2008 (Agarwal et al. [2013] , Guiso et al. [2013] ). In developing countries, governments have routinely implemented debt relief and debt restructuring programs, often targeted at the economically important and politically influential rural sector. Some recent examples include a US$ 2.9 billion bailout for farmers in Thailand and the restructuring of more than US$10 billion of household debt in Brazil.
Second, unlike many other political interventions in the credit market, it was a one-off initiative that left the formal institutional and regulatory environment unchanged, thus allowing us to isolate the effect of the capital injection. But perhaps more importantly, unlike any of the previous debt relief initiatives in India, eligibility for the bailout program depended on the amount of land pledged at the time of loan origination, typically many years prior to the program. This rule, applied retrospectively, implies that the share of credit that could qualify for the program is a function of the land distribution in a given district. The land distribution in turn interacts with the time series of productivity shocks faced by a given district to determine the share of qualifying credit that was actually in default at the time the program was introduced.
Our empirical strategy exploits this exogenous geographical variation in program exposure at the district level to identify the causal impacts of the bailout on ex-post credit supply and borrower behavior. Using public and proprietary data on bank lending and loan performance, we construct a new dataset tracing credit allocation and loan delinquencies for 491 districts of India over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . We match these data with information on the amount of debt relief as a share of total credit allocated in each district, which forms our primary measure of program exposure. The data reveal substantial variation in exposure to the debt relief program with the share of total credit waived under the program ranging from an average of less than 3% in some districts of the state of Goa to more than 50% of total credit in many districts of the states of Bihar, Jharkand, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh.
Our baseline estimates indicate that the bailout had a significant and economically large effect on post program credit allocation. These effects are larger in areas with greater exposure to the bailout, and robust to alternative specifications and construction of the variable measuring treatment intensity. A one standard deviation in the share of bailout leads to an increase in the growth rate of agricultural credit of 12.5% but no discernible increase in the number of accounts, indicating that additional credit was disbursed to existing customers in good standing. This suggests that banks acted conservatively by not expanding the customer base. Following the loan waiver program, however, defaults increased, either because borrower discipline declined (moral hazard) or because borrowers' debt burden had increased as the loan size was larger. To disentangle both explanations, we focus on defaults and disbursements around elections and find that while defaults increase before elections after the loan waiver, there is no such increase in disbursements. We thus conclude that moral hazard is the more likely explanation for the rise in defaults. Consistent with this explanation, we find no evidence of improvements in agricultural productivity following the loan waiver.
These results contribute to several strands of the literature. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first empirical evidence on the aggregate credit market and moral hazard implications of large-scale debt relief programs. In this sense our findings contribute to a nascent literature on the market response and broader economic impact of stimulus programs. Agarwal et al. [2013] study subsidized mortgage renegotiations under the Home Affordability Modification Program in the wake of the foreclosure crisis in the United States, and Mian and Sufi [2012] study the impact of a stimulus program offering subsidies for new car purchases on auto sales and broader economic outcomes. Our analysis differs from this literature as it focuses on a stimulus initiative enacted through credit market, considering its direct effect on subsequent lending on the intensive and extensive margins, and post-program moral hazard in loan repayment.
Because the bailout affected not only borrowers but was also tied to a recapitalization of banks refinanced by the Reserve Bank of India as part of ADWDRS, our results are also related to the literature on the real effects of bank recapitalizations (Diamond and Rajan [2000] , Paravisini [2008] , Philippon and Schnabl [2013] and Gianetti and Simonov [2013] ).
There is much reason to believe that prior to the announcement of ADWDRS, Indian banks faced significant incentives for evergreening de-facto non-performing loans. Reflecting a long history of directed lending (Burgess and Pande [2005] , Cole [2009a] ), all banks in India are required to lend 40% of their capital to "priority sectors", which include agriculture and small scale industry. Although this mandate forced the allocation of a significant share of credit to high-risk borrowers, local branches and branch managers faced sanctions for realizing losses and consequently had a significant incentive to keep lending to defaulters. The introduction of ADWDRS removed this incentive distortion. Consistent with the evergreening hypothesis (Peek and Rosengren [2005] ), we find evidence of a shift in post-program lending away from districts with a high-share of total credit waived under the bailout. Indeed, one dollar of bailout led to an increase in net lending in subsequent years of only 9 cents in a high-bailout district and almost 70 cents in a low-bailout district. This suggests that the bailout did not encourage greater risk-taking by banks and thus helps us isolate the effect of ADWDRS on bank risk-taking from its impact on borrower behavior. Despite the geographical reallocation of new lending towards districts with observably lower ex-ante risk, we find a significant negative effect of the program on loan performance, concentrated among borrowers that had previously been in good standing and who did not benefit from the bailout.
Finally, the finding that loan performance (but not loan size) is responsive to the electoral cycle and that this effect is magnified by the introduction of the ADWDRS bailout program contributes to the literature on the political economy of credit in emerging markets (Cole (2009 ), Dinç (2005 ) and underscores the concern with stimulus programs that they may lead to an anticipation of future interventions, especially in credit markets that have a history of political intervention.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview over the eligibility rules and timing of India's bailout program for rural households. Section 3 provides details about the data used and provides summary statistics. In Section 4 we discuss our empirical strategy and in ction 5 we present the results. Section 6 concludes.
India's Bailout Program for Rural Households
We study the impact of debt relief on credit supply and borrower moral hazard using a natural experiment generated by India's "Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Program The goal of the program was to refinance all private, public sector, cooperative and regional rural banks through the cancellation of their non-performing rural assets accumulated due to the long history of directed lending to the rural sector. In turn, this reduction of household debt would serve as stimulus against the debt overhang and lack of access to credit among highly indebted rural households. Given that the bailout was announced a year ahead of national elections, the program also acted as a significant transfer from urban to rural voters.
The rules for program eligibility were kept deliberately simple to allow for the swift processing of claims, and to minimize corruption at local bank branches tasked with identifying eligible borrowers. In contrast to earlier debt relief initiatives, eligibility for the program at the level of an individual loan depended on the amount of land pledged as collateral at the time a loan was originated, typically several years before the program. Small borrowers who had pledged less than two hectares of land were eligible for full debt relief, while borrowers with overdue loans that had pledged more than two hectares of land qualified for 25% conditional debt relief if they were able to repay the remaining balance. Loans qualified for debt relief if they were originated between December 31, 1997 and December 31, 2007, more than 90 days overdue as of December 31, 2007 and remained in default until February 28, 2008. These rules were announced retrospectively in the Indian finance minister's budget speech on March 18, 2008 so that there was no scope for manipulation around program dates. In addition, it was the first time that eligibility was based on landholdings and thus the rules were unanticipated.
Implementation of the program began in June 2008. Every bank branch in the country was asked to identify all loans and borrowers on its books that met the bailout eligibility criteria. As a transparency measure, branches were required to publicly post these beneficiary lists, including the identity of the borrower as well as the details of the qualifying loan.
Borrower lists underwent independent audits at the branch and bank level and an appeals process was put in place to allow borrowers a way to rectify errors in published beneficiary lists. Unconditional debt relief, which accounted for approximately 81% of claims, was processed immediately so that virtually all claims had been settled by the end of June 2008.
In contrast, the deadline for settling claims under the partial debt relief scheme for loans with collateral of more than two hectares of land was extended several times because of slow take-up -first to December 2009, and subsequently to December 2010. To ensure that we accurately capture the total amount of debt relief granted in a district, we use data as of December 2011, when the program was closed and all claims had been settled.
Data
Our dataset includes 489 districts for which we have information on debt relief amounts, as well as detailed credit outcomes and agricultural productivity data for the years 2001 to 2012. We aggregate all data to the level of an administrative district. In the base year 2001, India had 593 districts with an average population of 1,731,897 inhabitants. In that year the districts in our sample account for 94% of the Indian population and 89% of total bank credit.
1
How did exposure to the bailout affect ex-post credit supply and borrower behavior? The key challenge we need to overcome to address this question is to form a credible control group that was not affected by the program. But because all districts were affected we define a continuous treatment variable measuring program exposure rather than classifying districts into treatment and control groups. We then form counterfactuals using the cross-sectional variation in program exposure.
To measure a district's exposure to the bailout, we collected data on the amount of debt relief granted under the program from each state's State Level Bankers' Committee, the administrative body responsible for maintaining regionally disaggregated data on publicly supported credit market interventions. Using these data we construct a variable measuring 1 We have bank credit data for a total of 501 districts but in the analysis we drop 10 districts that correspond to the largest urban areas and 2 districts in Jammu and Kashmir that have virtually no bank penetration. 
( 1) whereκ d denotes the fraction of loans settled under the partial debt relief option for households above the two hectare cutoff. Because settlement was optional for households above the two hectare cutoff, our baseline estimates assumeκ d = 1, which is equivalent to estimating the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect for households with more than two hectares of land pledged as collateral.
2 To ensure that our measure of program exposure includes all debt waiver allocations under the program,the variable is calculated with administrative data reported in December 2011, after the program had officially closed and all allocations had been made. Table I loans that were previously ever-greened. Indeed, the mandate to lend 40% of capital to "priority sectors", including agriculture, and the sanctions that local branch managers face for realizing losses creates an incentive to evergreen the loans of defaulters. Once the program is announced, these loans can be shown as non-performing in the books so that they will be covered by the waiver program. Mechanically, after the program the share of NPLs decline sharply as defaults are waived, but over time NPLs raise again.
Data on agricultural productivity come from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture's database on crop yields. We use 2001 commodity prices from Indiastat to construct the value of agricultural production per hectare in a given district and year. Appendix C provides additional details on the construction of the productivity series.
The analysis controls for exogenous changes in credit conditions using local variation in monsoon rainfall. Rainfall data were obtained from the Indian Meteorological Department and measure monthly precipitation based on rainfall gauges located in each district. The rainfall variable we use in our analysis is total monsoon rainfall between July and September for the previous year as a fraction of the district's long-run rainfall average over the same period. The analysis also controls for the district's distance to the next scheduled state election by including a full set of electoral cycle dummies. Electoral data come from the Election Commission of India's database on state elections.
3 Finally, we use data on district characteristics from the Census of India and the Indian Agriculture Census. These data include the total population, urban and rural population shares, productivity and land distribution of each district. We provide additional details on the construction of variables in Appendix A. Summary statistics are reported in Table II .
Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of the bailout on credit supply and ex-post borrower behavior we exploit variation in debt relief at the district level, due to the fact that the same program rules were applied uniformly across the country. We use this source of quasi-exogenous variation in exposure to the ADWDRS program in Panel (a) of Figure 3 to estimate difference-in-differences regressions that compare outcomes across districts with different levels of program exposure before and after the bailout. Thus we have 11 years times 489 districts minus 461 district-year observations for which we lack a time-varing district level control, for a total of 4,918 observations. The fixed effects model that we estimate is as follows:
where Y dt /Y d,t−1 is the year-on-year change in one of our outcomes of interest, such as the number of outstanding loans, total credit or growth in NPLs, δ d is a district fixed effect, ϑ t is a year dummy or district time trend and X dt is a matrix of ime-varying district-specific controls. Exposure is an interaction between the share of rural credit written off under the program and a post-program dummy, which is equal to one for all years after 2008 and zero otherwise. Hence, the coefficient γ is our differences-in-differences estimate of program impact. To facilitate the interpretation of the estimate of γ, the variable "bailout share" is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. We estimate the model in (2) by weighted least squares (WLS) because smaller districts may have poorer credit administrative data and might depend on a smaller number of crops becoming more vulnerable to exogenous shocks as a result. We construct the weights using the log of total outstanding credit in the base year 2001 as a proxy for the size of the district economy. 4 . Standard errors are clustered at the district level, the same unit of analysis at which exposure to the program is observed.
The validity of our identification strategy depends on the assumption that average changes in outcomes in the pre-and post-program periods are unrelated to the bailout share in a given district. This assumption would be violated if, for example, loan or credit growth were on a different time trend in districts with greater exposure to the program. While this assumption is fundamentally untestable, we report three different specifications to demonstrate that the identification assumption is unlikely to be violated. At the same time, these different specifications can be thought of as robustness checks that address other possible 4 See Strahan and Jayaratne [1996] for a similar approach challenges to our identification strategy.
First, the inclusion of district fixed effects control for time-invariant differences in credit growth and other outcomes of interests that differ due to unobserved factors at the district level. Some examples might include differences in local public expenditure, the distribution of land or differential exposure to price or productivity shocks. The inclusion of district fixed effects also accounts for the possibility of mean reversion in credit and productivity growth.
Second, we account for the presence of regional credit cycles. To do this, we first include a set of electoral cycle dummies in all of our specifications. The electoral cycle dummies indicate the number of years until the next scheduled state election and account for the fact that both credit and loan performance have been shown to be strongly correlated with the electoral cycle.
In our second specification, we additionally account for the presence of regional cycles in credit and loan performance that are unrelated to the timing of elections. This approach reduces the likelihood that our estimate γ is biased by a correlation between program exposure and the regional business cycle. We use the Reserve Bank of India's four administrative zones and divide India into four regions accordingly. This specification includes interactions between year effects and regional dummies to allow for variation in regional cycles and uses 44 degrees of freedom.
Finally, we estimate a version of our core empirical model that allows each district to be on a separate linear time trend at a cost of 489 degrees of freedom. This third specification serves as an additional robustness check and reduces the likelihood that the estimated differencein-differences treatment effect γ is biased by a correlation between program exposure and pre-existing time trends in our key outcomes of interest.
Results
Tables III and IV report the main results. The dependent variables in Table III relate trends is more conservative, we take this specification as our preferred one. In addition, all regressions control for the deviation of lagged monsoon rainfall from its normal average since agriculture production in India is mostly rainfed and the quality of the monsoon is likely to affect the default rate and subsequent credit growth. The regressions also control for the number of years since the next state election because the credit market behaves differently during election years (Cole [2009b] ). All regressions include district fixed effects and are weighted by the district's total credit outstanding in 2001. Each cell in Tables III and IV reports the coefficient of interest γ which corresponds to the differences-in-differences estimate of program impact.
Panel A of Table III reports the program impact on total agricultural credit. In columns 1-3 we find that program exposure leads to no increase in the growth in the number of loans but in columns 4-6 program exposure does lead to an increase in the growth rate of agricultural credit. In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in program exposure leads to an increase in the growth rate of agricultural credit of 3.7% according to the preferred specification of column 6. These results suggest that new credit was given to existing customers, most likely those that did not participate in the loan waiver and that were therefore in good standing. In addition, it appears that banks are now lending more conservatively after the loan waiver, which may suggest that the bailout was large enough to solve the banks' debt overhang problem (Gianetti and Simonov [2013] ).
Panel B of Table III The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if there is an increase in non performing assets in a given disrict and year. Columns 1-3 use data for 489 districts while columns 4-6 restrict the sample to 237 districts where competition among banks defined by the number of branches in the district per capita is above the median. Using either sample we find an increase in the probability of positive growth rate of non-performing loans. Panel B reports the result of a placebo test where the post-program dummy is defined to take the value one after 2007, restricting again the sample to 2008. Using this placebo post-program dummy we find no impact on the probability of growth in defaults, suggesting again that the program did cause the increase in defaults. However, this increase in defaults could be due to the higher debt burden given that the loan sizes increased after the program or to moral hazard as borrowers inferred from the waiver that future interventions might be in store, and therefore that the consequences of default were not as severe. Table IV is most likely due to moral hazard, since the expectation of future bailout is heightened in the run-up to elections.
An important aim of economic stimulus programs is to stabilize output, and to prevent distortions in investment and consumption decisions during exceptionally harsh economic circumstances. In the case of debt relief for rural households, it is often argued that extreme levels of indebtedness create "debt overhang" and severe disincentives for investment, so that economic stimulus programs enacted as debt relief hold the promise of improving the productivity of recipient households. The ADWDRS program offers a compelling test of this proposition. To explore the effect of debt relief on agricultural productivity, we take advantage of detailed district level panel on commodity prices and crop yields from the Indian Department of Agriculture. The dataset, which we describe in more detail in Appendix C, contains seasonal information on agricultural revenue and area cultivated so that we can construct time series of agricultural productivity over the time period 2001-2011 for 387 districts in our sample. Table VII uses this variable as the outcome of interest to investigate the impact of the stimulus program on agricultural productivity. The results show that there is no discernible effect of ADWDRS on agricultural productivity. Using our preferred specification, the estimated effect is a precise zero, suggesting that the stimulus did not create investment incentives of a magnitude sufficient to affect agricultural productivity. Table V Finally Tables VIII and IX explore the heterogeneity of impacts of the program. Table   VIII focuses on heterogeneity in district income. Our criterion for splitting the sample into high and low-income districts is whether districts receive support from the Backward Region Grant Fund Program (BRGF), a federal grant program targeted to the 250 poorest districts in the country. Using our preferred specification in columns 3, 6 and 9 we find that the effects of the program are concentrated in higher income districts, perhaps where the growth opportunities were larger. Table IX 
Conclusion
Around the world, governments have routinely intervened in credit markets in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Although it is often hypothesized that such interventions have severe repercussions for credit discipline and borrower expectations, surprisingly little robust evidence exists to evaluate these claims. In this paper, we use a natural experiment surrounding one of the largest borrower bailouts in history to estimate the effect of a large economic stimulus program on productivity and loan repayment.
We find that the program generated no measurable productivity gains, but led to significant moral hazard in loan repayment. The annual post-program increase in the share of non-performing loans grows up to 5 annual percentage points faster in districts in the highest quintile of the debt relief distribution. Importantly, our findings also suggest a mechanism for the amplification of moral hazard in loan repayment arising from economic stimulus enacted through the credit market. We show that the relationship between defaults and the electoral cycle documented by earlier studies is magnified by the bailout program. This suggests that the adverse effects of the bailout become more persistent as the stimulus generates expectations of future politically motivated interventions in the credit market.
Taken together, these results provide some of the first evidence on the moral hazard generated by large government stimulus programs operating through the credit market. While such programs have received much attention in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, it is worth noting that programs of this kind, often more frequent and larger in scale, have been carried out in many developing countries. Understanding the moral hazard consequences of these large-scale economic stimulus programs is essential to weighing their costs and benefits, particularly in an environment where weak institutions make such programs susceptible to political capture and manipulation. The results in this paper are a first step in this broader research agenda. (1) is the share of non-performing l loans, as previously defined. The dependent variable in column [4] is agricultural productivity, measured as the log revenue per hectare of all agricultural output in a district-year. All regressions control for the deviation of lagged monsoon rainfall from its long run average and a full set of electoral cycle dummies. Robust standard errors, in brackets, are clustered by district. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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(1) and control for the deviation of lagged monsoon rainfall from its long run average, and years until the next state election. Robust standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the district level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
(1)
(8) (1) This table reports estimates from cross-sectional regressions of program exposure on measures of the land distribution and the time series of weather shocks at the distric level. The dependent variable in all columns is the amount of debt relief as a share of total outstanding agricultural credit at the time of the program. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Standard errors are given in brackets and calculated using the Huber-White correction for heteroskedasticity. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
(1) Total adult population and rural population of each district between the ages of 15-65 years in 2001.
Census of India, District Tables (2001) Total agricultural productivity
Per hectar value of output of 32 standard crops in units of Rs 1,000 at the district level.
India Agriculture Census, District Tables (2001) Land distribution Share of landholdings in the district less than two hectares (approximately 5 acres) in size.
India Agriculture Census, District Tables (2001) Drought Affected District Dummy variable equal to one if a district was classified as 'drought affected' at the time that the debt relief program came into effect. The program had a higher minimum disbursement for qualifying households in these districts. 
B Program Exposure by State
This section reports the share of total credit waived at the state level ordered by program exposure. Bailout share denotes the share of total agricultural credit outstanding waived under the program and includes both unconditional debt relief for households below the 2 hectare program threshold and conditional debt relief for households above the program cutoff. The reported state level figures are the average figure for all districts in each state included in our dataset.
